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The purpose of this study is to present the phenomenon of temporary institutions. 
Institutional theorists generally describe institutions as permanent and resistant to change. 
However, in practice, temporary institutions exist and challenge the perceived stability that 
scholars suggest institutions to have. By presenting temporary institutions, we explain how they 
are conceived from transnational organizations and can have lasting effects on a host nations 
endemic institutional framework. We further justify that the phenomenon is inadequately 
explained by related theories and therefore is a unique construct. Via an inductive case study 
design we present a temporary institution by observing and analyzing the institutional framework 
using institutional indicators (regulative, normative, cognitive) to evaluate changes in beer 
consumption laws in Brazilian football stadia before, during and after the FIFA World Cup 2014. 
Our findings support our initial propositions surrounding temporary institutions. First, FIFA as a 
transnational organization implemented a temporary institutional framework in Brazil replacing 
previous beer consumption laws in football stadia to support its sponsor, Budweiser. Second, 
after the World Cup key figures in states of Brazil questioned the institutional framework 
surrounding beer consumption in football stadia that existed before the World Cup. Finally, we 
observe that our findings cannot be described by related theories suggesting its uniqueness in 
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A temporary institution. Amongst most institutional theorists this would be considered an 
oxymoron. An oxymoron, since “nearly all definitions of institutions treat them as relatively 
enduring features of political and social life (rules, norms, procedures) that structure behavior 
and that cannot be changed easily or instantaneously” (Mahoney & Thelen 2010, 4). Yet, 
temporary institutions do exist and can be an important element of social life, for many nations.  
In this paper, we will address the previously underexplored phenomenon of temporary 
institutions and offer meaningful practical and theoretical implications.  
Institutions are typically understood to be permanent. Permanence is one of the most 
commonly observed properties of institutions described by theorists. This perception is shared 
across a number of domains, in politics (Clemens & Cook 1999; Moe, 1987: Riker, 1962; Ingram 
& Clay, 2000), sociology (Cooley, 1956; Hughes, 1936; Scott, 2008) and organizational theory 
(Selznick, 1948; Parsons, 1960: Simon, 1945). They are perceived to be impermeable to change, 
since institutions are generally conceived from reciprocated interpretations, and repeated actions 
among actors from generation to generation (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
Kostova & Roth, 2002; Zucker 1977). Furthermore, if institutions do change, it is often reflected 
as previous institutional arrangements on newly created institutions (Greif, 2006; Riker 1995; 
Scott, 2008).   
Since a common understanding of institutional theory is that institutions persist, temporary 
institutions fundamentally contradict institutional persistence. Temporary institutions contradict 
how institutions are often conceived since, they are created for events to replace national 
endemic institutions for a specified temporal period of time. For example, temporary institutions 
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are often introduced into a host nation by “mega events” such as cultural events (World fair / 
World EXPO), sports events (World Cup and Olympics) and political gatherings (IMF and 
World Bank conferences). Each of these events comes to a host country with their own 
institutional framework (temporary institution) to host a successful event. For example, FIFA 
(Fédération Internationale de Football Association), the organizing body of football (soccer), 
hosts its flagship event “The World Cup” every four years. The World Cup, hosted in a single 
country has to meet FIFA’s standards for a successful event. In order for an event to be 
“successful”, the hosting nation must implement certain institutional reforms to FIFA’s liking, 
outlined within the “Guide to bidding document” (FIFA, 2018; FIFA, 2007). Some of these 
“reforms” require tax exemptions to FIFA and third parties related to FIFA, national protection 
of FIFA’s commercial rights, upgrades in national security, developments in transportation, 
improved stadia, availability of hotels and many other structural changes. One notable example 
in South Africa, FIFA pressured for the introduction of a stricter, swifter, criminal justice system 
or as labeled in South Africa “instant justice courts”. South Africa introduced 56 of these courts 
across the country to provide “swift, summary and severe deterrents during the month-long 
World Cup” (Hughes, 2010). In our study, we investigate how FIFA introduced beer sales into 
Brazilian stadia which was previously banned due to violence concerns. It is the demanded 
change in norms and rules and replacement of endemic institutional structures orchestrated by a 
transnational organization like FIFA that we label as a temporary institution. 
This study contributes to theories on social objects (institutions, institutional change, 
transnational corporations) in several ways. First, we empirically identify and describe the 
phenomenon of temporary institutions. Second, by comparing and contrasting temporary 
institutions with existing theories in the institutional domain (institutional theory, process of 
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institutional change and work on multinational corporations in relation with institutions) we 
justify temporary institutions to be a unique construct. Third, we highlight how transnational 
organizations implant temporary institutions into a host nation. Finally, we explore the effects 
that temporary institutions have on a host’s nations endemic institutional environment. 
By presenting temporary institutions as a unique construct, we suggest the contributions 
extend beyond theory but also are important in practice. Primarily, by introducing the 
institutional impact and existence of temporary institutions we address certain conflicted 
understanding of the impact of “mega events”. For example, some researchers studying the 
World Cup point to its benefits: employment (Goodman & Stern, 1994), revenue (Goodman & 
Stern, 1994; Matheson & Baade, 2005; Sterken, 2006). While others point to the same flaws, 
employment (Hagn & Maennig, 2007) or revenue (Liu, 2013; Feddersen, Grötzinger & Maennig, 
2008). By acknowledging the presence and impact of temporary institutions, national 
governments could potentially better anticipate the institutional impact of temporary institutions. 
Second, local and international organizations, by being aware of temporary institutions impact, 
could use temporary institutions to obtain favorable institutional outcomes.  
 Using an inductive case study design, we explore changes in beer laws before, during and 
after the FIFA World Cup 2014 in Brazil. The subsequent section justifies temporary institutions 
by presenting in greater detail the similarities and differences with theories on institutions, 
institutional change, and transnational organizations. We then use our empirical observations to 
demonstrate our proposed phenomena. We conclude by proposing a model of temporary 







To introduce our proposed phenomena, we 1) establish how institutions are generally 
conceived, 2) introduce that temporary institutions exist 3) and show that they are in fact 
institutions. Therefore, we suggest that what may have been overlooked in institutional research 
is the concept of temporariness and to a certain extent institutional change.  
Institutions as defined by Scott (2008: 48) are “comprised of regulative, normative and 
cultural-cognitive elements that, together with associated activities and resources, provide 
stability and meaning to social life”.  Within this dense definition there are a number of concepts 
that define institutions, 1) institutional pillars (regulative, normative and cultural/cognitive) and 
2) activities/resources. Institutions are considered to comprise of three pillars (regulative, 
normative and cognitive). These three pillars exist to structure actors within an institutional 
framework via “legal, moral and cultural boundaries” (Scott; 2008: 58), defining acceptable and 
unacceptable behaviour (Scott; 2008). It is the combination of explicit regulative boundaries with 
“the more or less a taken-for-granted part of … social reality” (Zucker, 1997: 728) that “control 
human conduct by setting up predefined patterns of conduct, which channel it in one direction as 
against the many other directions that would be theoretically possible” (Berger & Luckmann, 
1966: 55).  Further, activities and resources empower these “patterns of conduct” for “schemas 
not empowered or regenerated by resources would eventually be abandoned and forgotten, just 
as resources without cultural schemas to direct their use would eventually dissipate and decay” 
(Sewell 1992: 13). As previously introduced a feature deeply engrained in institutional theory is 
that institutions are often considered stable and resistant to change (Hughes, 1936; Mahoney & 
Thelen 2010; Sine & David, 2003; Zucker 1977). This understanding is shared across different 
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streams of institutional domains. In political studies, institutions are commonly seen as durable 
(Clemens & Cook 1999; Moe, 1987: Riker, 1962; Ingram & Clay, 2000). In sociology, despite 
some theorists suggesting that institutions are evolving entities (Spencer 1876, 1896, 1910; 
Sumner 1906) others suggest they are rather permanent (Cooley, 1956). Hughes (1936: 180), for 
example, noted that institutions are: “establishment of relative permanence of a distinctly social 
sort”. Finally, within the organizational field, organizations are limited to rigid institutional 
boundaries suggesting institutions are inflexible (Selznick, 1948; Parsons, 1960: Simon, 1945). 
Stability and resistance to change is shared across the disciplines and the characteristics of 
institutions. Primarily, institutions are the result of reciprocated interpretations and/or repeated 
actions (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Kostova & Roth, 2002). Second, 
institutions in the case of change are reflections of previous institutions thus still suggesting 
permanent unchanging values (Greif, 2006; Riker 1995; Scott, 2008). There are many examples 
suggesting the permanence, replicability and continuality of institutions, but this fundamentally 
contradicts the proposed phenomena. Therefore, to describe a temporary institution is an 
oxymoron, given the enduring nature of institutions (Greif, 2006; Riker 1995; Scott 2008). 
But, as previously introduced, temporary institutions exist and are often introduced into a 
host nation by “mega events” such as cultural events (World fair / World EXPO), sports events 
(World Cup and Olympics) and political gatherings (IMF and World Bank conferences). It is the 
multi-level nature of these organizations and the lack of isomorphism across its levels which 
allows temporary institutions to become a reality (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000; Rousseau, 1985). 
Carriers of institutions exist at two levels, permanently as a transnational governance 
organization and temporarily during periodic mega events at national/municipal levels. At the 
transnational level, the institutional criterion of persistence is met, for example organizations 
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such as FIFA continue to exist before and after its World Cup events. However, during mega 
events, temporary institutions exist as an “alien” institution, temporarily transforming endemic 
institutions of the host country for the duration of the mega-event. This naturally presents 
significant institutional challenges, as the institutional environment over which a nation usually 
has sovereignty is for a certain duration “invaded”. While an institution usually requires 
legitimacy (Scott, 2008) and taken-for-grantedness (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Temporary 
institutions when entering a host nation only have one form of legitimacy, which is that they are 
legitimatized by the host nations government, which had bid to host the event. However, 
temporary institutions lack taken-for-grantedness at the national level by local actors. Tourists 
and local fans of the sport may take certain institutional changes for granted, however this is not 
necessarily true for national actors who have little interest in the event. Therefore, temporary 
institutions have one form of legitimacy, but lack the legitimacy that is usually additionally 
provided by all local actors (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Dornbusch & Scott, 1975; Tost, 2011) 
which could lead to conflict. However, since temporary institutions exist only for a short period 
of time, contestation is often too late (during the event) and is restricted by the regulative 
boundaries imposed by local authorities that invited the event. Thus, as long as mega-events are 
bid for by a host nation, temporary institutions can exist.  
Thus, temporary institutions can be defined as institutions that exist for a set period of 
time, replacing sections of a national endemic institutions to complete a task. They can be 
conceived as institutions, for they share key characteristics of common definitions of institutions. 
Primarily per the definition of Scott (2008), enforce certain “pillars” of institutions. For example, 
the Olympics and the World Cup ensure compliance to regulative demands when nations bid for 
the event through their bid documents (COHRE, 2007; FIFA, 2018; FIFA, 2007). These events 
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sometimes even pressure for normative boundaries, for example, the Boston municipal 
government and city employees were initially not allowed to criticize the Olympics for its 2024 
bid (Cassidy, 2015). Further temporary institutions are “legitimate” as per the authorization of 
the host country’s government. Temporary institutions are, like normal institutions, thus able to 
“control human conduct by setting up predefined patterns of conduct” (Berger & Luckmann, 
1966: 55). Yet they are different from commonly observed durable institutions, 1) temporary 
institutions replace endemic institutions for a period of time; 2) temporary institutions lack 
cognitive taken-for-grantedness that typically characterizes institutions, and 3) temporary 
institutions are neither reflections of past national institutions nor necessarily reflect future 
national institutions, as suggested by institutional theory/institutional change literature (Grief, 
2006; Riker, 1995; Scott, 2008).  
Temporary institutions are institutions, yet they are not constituted by all elements of 
more permanent institutions. The following sections identify two research streams that bear 
similarities with temporary institutions but cannot fully explain the phenomenon.  
 
Institutional change 
While institutions are typically considered by most scholars as facets of society that are 
symbols of stability and persistence, some theorists have suggested that institutions are dynamic 
making them permeable to change (Garud, Jain & Kumaraswamy, 2002; Greenwood & 
Suddaby, 2006; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; Meyer 1994; Scott, 2008; Suchman, 1995) 
Institutional change is similar to temporary institutions in that they both challenge the 
permanence of institutions. Despite sharing resemblance, institutional change literature fails to 
explain temporary institutions. The following section addresses the similarities and differences 
between temporary institutions and institutional change. By outlining the differences, we suggest 
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what might be overlooked in work on institutional change and how temporary institutions fills 
that void. 
Most theorists who study institutional change suggest that institutions change slowly, 
“Once created, institutions often change in subtle and gradual ways over time” (Mahoney & 
Thelen, 2010: 1). Of those who theorize on institutional change, reasoning for change is often 
divided into supply or demand side explanations (Scott, 2008). Meyer (1994) offers a supply side 
explanation to institutional change suggesting that certain actors embedded within an 
institutional framework (sciences/professions) have institutional roles which enable them to 
devise new schemes, tendencies, norms and values without the change being questioned. 
Examples of supply side causes for institutional change may be actors such as: the state, 
professional occupations, associations, corporate elites, marginal actors, social movements and 
all actors whom participate within an institution (Scott, 2008: 97-103). When comparing supply 
side explanations of institutional change with temporary institutions there are a number of 
similarities. Primarily, temporary institutions are a result of independent actors (transnational 
organizations) whom similarly to institutional entrepreneurs have a stake in changing/replacing 
an endemic institution. However, temporary institutions are distinctly different as they are 1) not 
“embedded” within an institutional framework 2) and they do not change an endemic institution 
but rather replace it temporarily.  
  An opposing view for institutional change is offered by Suchman (1995) who posits a 
demand side explanation. Suchman (1995) suggests that institutions are created based on 
problems facing a society to which there are no current solutions. There are a number of demand 
side variables that explain institutional change: the absence of clear boundaries (Clemens & 
Cook; 1999), internal contradictions in the institutional structure (Clemens & Cook; 1999, Hiatt, 
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Sine, & Tolbert; 2009), multiple institutions competing or that are not properly established 
(Clemens & Cook; 1999, Mahoney & Thelen; 2010), institutionalized assumptions (Sine & 
David; 2003) and/or unexpected relationships between institutionalized practices (Sine & David; 
2003). But the demand side reasoning for institutional change fails to explain temporary 
institutions. Although temporary institutions when entering a host nation may bring to the 
surface institutional flaws of endemic institutions, they do not exist to solve problems facing a 
society to which there are no solutions. Rather temporary institutions emerge to complete a task 
divorced from a potentially existing void from a flaw in a host nation institutional arrangement. 
Temporary institutions cannot be explained by demand side explanations for institutional change 
since they exist outside a host nation and are not created as a result of flaws/problems in a host 
nation endemic institution.  
A final comparison between temporary institutions and institutional change is the 
phenomenon of a jolt/shock. Meyer (1982: 515), defines environmental jolts as: “transient 
perturbations whose occurrences are difficult to foresee and whose impact on organizations are 
disruptive and often inimical”. Although most scholars who study institutional change perceive 
institutions to change slowly (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010), some scholars point to exogenous 
shocks and or environmental shifts as reasons for institutional change.  Some examples may 
include: war, environmental shifts, economic change and/or new laws (DiMaggio, 1997; 
Fligstein 1990; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; Sewell, 1992; Sine & David, 2003). While some 
“shocks and jolts” may come from within an institutional framework, at other times these might 
spring from phenomena exterior to endemic institutions. It is for the reason that shocks and jolts 
can exist outside of an institutional framework that it is important to compare it with temporary 
institutions. Despite both being exogenous to a national institutional environment, temporary 
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institutions are not a single “occurrence” such as a jolt or shock but rather exist temporarily. 
Further temporary institutions do not necessarily impact endemic institutions after they have 
departed.  
 It is important to understand all relevant theories of institutional change as it allows the 
paper to identify the gap in institutional change literature and position temporary institutions as a 
unique construct. To summarize the key differences between temporary institutions and 
institutional change is that 1) it does not necessarily change endemic institution but rather 
temporarily replaces it 2) temporary institutions are not reflections of previous institutions as 
suggested by institutional theory/institutional change (Greif, 2006; Riker 1995; Scott, 2008) and, 
3) they cannot be explained by supply and demand side rationales. The following section looks at 
multinational enterprises (MNE) and demonstrates that, despite temporary institutions being 
organized by a multinational enterprise, they are distinctly different.  
 
MNE’s and institutions 
Multinational enterprises (MNE) or multinational corporations (MNC) have become 
increasingly prevalent in institutional research (Dacin, Kostova, & Roth, 2008). Since temporary 
institutions exist as a result of transnational organizations, it is important to distinguish MNEs 
from temporary institutions. Furthermore, previous research suggests that MNEs can in certain 
situations influence national institutional frameworks (Dacin, Kostova, & Roth, 2008). 
Therefore, MNEs at face value share resemblance with temporary institutions. But, as we now 
show, they fall short of explaining the phenomenon of temporary institution.  
Typically, MNEs are not able to have direct influence at a national level. Primarily, an 
MNE is not provided legitimacy by local governments when entering a nation but must conform 
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with the institutional framework (regulative, normative and cognitive) of a host nation to gain 
legitimacy (Dacin, Kostova, & Roth, 2008; Doh & Guay, 2004; Hiatt, Sine, & Tolbert, 2009 
Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). For example, Dacin, Kostova, & Roth 
(2008: 996) state: “(national) institutional environments grant legitimacy of organizations based 
on organizational compliance with institutional requirements”.  MNEs may have institutional 
agendas, but some cannot as easily achieve institutional change, while others are able to do so. 
For example, according to Dacin, Kostova, & Roth (2008), MNEs can achieve institutional 
change in transitional economies where there is institutional instability. But this limitation does 
not apply to MNEs imposing temporary institutions or piggy backing on temporary institutions 
when entering national institutional environments. 
As previously identified transnational organizations such as FIFA are multinational 
enterprises at the international level. However, at a national level, FIFA creates its own 
temporary institution to successfully host its flagship event: The World Cup. And they do so with 
the accord of the nation in which the World Cup is hosted: when a host nation bids to host an 
event such as the Olympics or the World Cup, they must be organizationally compliant with 
FIFA’s institutional requirements. The temporary institutions brought about by MNEs such as 
FIFA thus present a unique case within MNE research where nations adapt institutions to 
organizational demands rather than the other way around.  
In summary, previous research on MNEs in the institutional domain have potentially 
overlooked certain abilities of MNEs. Despite research suggesting that MNEs are able to 
influence institutional environments, it has thus far overlooked how MNEs via temporary 
institutions are able to achieve this. Theorists have suggested MNEs’ activities should become 
isomorphic with a host nations institutional requirements, but they have not identified how 
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certain host nations become isomorphic with MNEs institutional demands. This is where our 




The objective of the theoretical framework was to identify gaps in literature on social 
objects (institutions, organizations, etc.) and explain how temporary institutions fill that void. We 
introduced how transnational organizations might impose temporary institutions into a host 
nation. To position the following sections, the key gaps previously identified are summarized. 
Institutions are commonly perceived as durable and resistant to change. The notion of a 
temporary institution is therefore an oxymoron, yet they do exist. Temporary institutions, 
institutions that exist for a set period of time, replacing sections of a national endemic 
institutions to complete a task share similarities and differences to institutions as previously 
defined in institutional theory. Temporary institutions like institutions are similar in that they are: 
“comprised of regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements that, together with 
associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life” (Scott, 2008: 48) 
and “control human conduct by setting up predefined patterns of conduct” (Berger & Luckmann, 
1966: 55). However, unlike institutions, temporary institutions appear for a limited period. When 
doing so, they replace endemic institutions as their features do not necessarily reflect previous or 
future institutions. 
Despite many theories indicating the durability of institutions, some theorists identify that 
institutions change. Temporary institutions could be considered as a form of institutional change 
as it replaces and therefore changes endemic institutions. However, the majority of institutional 
change literature looks at either institutional actors embedded within an institution as sources of 
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change (supply) or change due to flaws in institutional environments that need solving (demand). 
Temporary institutions are neither. Temporary institutions are not embedded in the endemic 
institutional environment and do not have the purpose of permanently changing an institution 
(supply). Also, temporary institutions do not exist due to flaws of endemic institutions (demand). 
Other literature suggests shocks/jolts to cause institutional change but again fail to explain a 
temporary institution for its impact is for a set period of time not necessarily changing an 
endemic institution after it has departed.  
Finally, MNEs have become increasingly prevalent in institutional research. Research 
into MNEs suggests that MNEs have limited institutional impact and that companies should 
conform to national institutional values. This fails to explain how temporary institutions 
transform an endemic institution as nations respond to MNEs institutional demands to secure 
bids for international events, and how this can create institutional change via temporary 
institutional frameworks.  
From the literature review, we suggest that temporariness is novel to the institutional 
field. The concept of temporariness exists within the organization field (temporary organizations) 
(Burke & Morley, 2016), where organizations set up temporary organizations to complete a task. 
Although similar in definition, this stream of research only focuses on organizations, not 
institutions. Work that is semantically related to temporary institutions includes a study from 
Ambrus & Wessel (2015). By looking at how legal structures are often unable to undergo rapid 
change, the authors found examples on the international domain where organizations stepped in 
to work with institutions to apply justice. This is sometimes necessary as law is complicated for 
it “must be responsive and indeterminate, capable of extending to the infinite variety that 
confronts it … and be saturated in temporality.” (Fitzpatrick, 2014: 185). Therefore, its 
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relationship with change and time is odd as it often takes centuries of struggle, long lasting 
practice and/or effort by a number of actors to change a legal system (Ambrus & Wessel, 2015). 
Ambrus & Wessel (2015) identified examples such as UN operations in Kosovo and East Timor. 
In these cases, the UN took direct action in administering justice, training police and re-
establishing law therefore bypassing the usual long process of legal change. This work, despite 
being semantically related, does not explain temporary institutions since these temporary legal 
amendments worked together with national institutions defining future regulative structures, 
rather than replacing institutional environments, such as in the case of temporary institutions.  
It is important to recognise and understand temporary institutions for they exist in 
practice but lack acknowledgment and understanding in theory. The following section presents 
our methodology for testing for the existence of temporary institutions, how transnational 
organizations introduce temporary institutions into a host nation and the effects it has on endemic 
institutions.   
 
Data & Methodology  
 
Research Design 
As temporary institutions are conceived as temporarily changing/replacing endemic 
institutions, we explore the phenomenon using a process case study (Langley, 1999). It is based 
on a historical narrative of the changes in an institutional environment before, during and after a 
temporary institution’s presence. An inductive embedded case study design (Yin, 2003) is used, 
triangulating a single institutional change (primary unit of analysis) through developments in 




 The institutional change measured as a representative of temporary institutions had to 
represent a critical case for the above-mentioned theory. To be able to describe the institutional 
change that happened, it had to be able to describe a change in an endemic institutions regulative, 
normative and/or cognitive institutional structures. Therefore, it had to meet a number of 
methodological requirements: 1) it had to have had an impact before, during, and after the 
presence of the temporary institution to identify observable changes; 2) yet, it also had to be 
recent in history so that it still had a current impact so both informants and information sources 
would be able to cover topics sufficiently at all three-time frames.  
Changes in beer regulations in stadia during and after the 2014 FIFA World Cup met the 
criteria specified. FIFA is sponsored by Budweiser and at all World Cups its beer must be 
present. As the case will demonstrate, beer was not allowed in Brazilian stadia before the event. 
It began to be sold during the World Cup, which to this day has left regulative, normative and 
cognitive impacts on Brazilian society. This phenomenon was sufficiently covered in the media 
as the ban existed not very long before Brazil was awarded the World Cup, because during the 
event the international media criticized changes associated with beer in stadia, and after the event 
beer legalization within stadia still remains a very controversial topic that is of interest to the 
press. Therefore, this case is methodologically relevant as it had a measurable impact across all 
three-time frames, is still is “fresh” in the memory of participants, and benefit from intense 
media coverage. It is for these reasons that the case may be able to provide supporting evidence 




Data collection  
Following Yin (2003), triangulation methods were used to develop converging lines of 
inquiry (Patton, 1987). The exploration of changing beer laws as a result of temporary 
institutions was based on secondary sources and complemented by interviews with stakeholders 
such as employees of Budweiser/Anheuser-Busch InBev, local journalists, professors and 
activists. Secondary data sources include translated state and national legal documents, 
interviews, images, FIFA documents and news articles covering changes in beer laws from a 
variety of different sources. 166 documents were collected in total (Appendix D). 
 The sampling of informants was performed via a judgement sample (Marshall, 1996). 
Since key stakeholders continuously expressed their opinions publicly, it was possible to use 
media records and public documents to stratify participants into different public attitudes towards 
the institutional transformations. A snowball sampling method was used, where participants were 
able to suggest other informants. This is adequate due to participants proximity and knowledge 
of the case (Marshall, 1996). This method ensured that several perspectives on the topic from all 
stakeholders were recorded. These were then further analyzed using secondary sources. Ideally 
more interviews would have been collected, but time limitations, difficulties in accessing 
stakeholders and language barriers were important factors that precluded from recruiting more 
interviewees. 
 From March until July 2019, we performed 6 interviews. All interviewees gave consent 
to recording, interviews were audiotaped and subsequently transcribed using Sonix (an audio to 
text transcribing device). Audio recordings fed into Sonix were subsequently re-listened and 
edited to match the exact phrasing of participants. Further, notes were taken during the 
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interviews to further substantiate audio recordings where necessary. The interviews lasted on 
average 24 minutes. The questions were open-ended, with the same general structure of 
questions often following the narrative of the case before, during and after World Cup. The 
content of the questions was similar for key historical information yet different depending on the 
specific knowledge of each stakeholder. The archival data spanned across the three-time frames 
of interest: before, during and after the event.  For the timeframe before the event, we collected 
31 articles from the period before March 2014. These files are further substantiated by legal 
documents, interviews, FIFA documents and imagery. Key phrases to find documents within this 
section include lei do torcedor (Statute of the fan), lei geral da copa do mundo (general law of 
the World Cup) and leis de cerveja e a copa do mundo (beer laws and the World Cup). For the 
timeframe during the event, we collected 23 articles from the period before March 2014 to 
August 2014. These files are further substantiated by legal documents, interviews, FIFA 
documents and imagery. Key phrases to find documents within this section include leis de 
cerveja durante a copa do mundo (beer laws during the World Cup), para consumo de cerveja 
em estádios de futebol (for beer consumption in football stadia) and contra o consumo de cerveja 
em estádios de futebol (against beer consumption in football stadia). Finally, for the timeframe 
after the event, we collected 83 articles from the period after August 2014. These files are further 
substantiated by legal documents, interviews, FIFA documents and imagery. Key search avenues 
used for this section were individual searches for beer laws per state. Key phrases used for 
searching for articles used across all three periods were, leis de cerveja (Beer laws), cerveja nos 
estádios de futebol (beer in football stadia) and a favor e contra o consumo de cerveja nos 
estádios de futebol (for and against beer consumption in football stadia). Three major sources 
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used were Brazilian news websites Universo Online (UOL), O Globo and Estadao as they 
covered the topic across all three-time frames with sufficient depth.  
 
Data analysis  
The historical narrative, mainly based on the secondary sources collected, allowed us to 
separate the events of the case study into three stages: 1) A period of institutional stability in the 
years before the World Cup, 2) a period of presence of a temporary institution during the World 
Cup, and 3) a period of institutional change following the World Cup. Using Scott’s (2008) 
pillars of institutions (regulative, normative and cognitive), media records are chronologically 
separated into the three time periods and analyzed. Further, for clarity and since key regulative 
activities triggered changes in the institutional environment, a timeline was created (Appendix 
A) to chronologically reflect regulative changes in Brazil. Using this timeline, normative and 
cognitive changes can be identified against the regulative changes. Regulative changes are 
demonstrated via the timeline in Appendix A, while normative and cognitive sentiment changes 
were measured by media coverage, mainly demonstrated by quotes and images. According to 
Dowling & Pfeffer, (1975) norms and values are reflected in public communications and can be 
measured via news articles.   
 This analytical approach enabled us to use multiple sources of evidence to establish a 
chain of events (regulative changes) and measure opinions (normative & cognitive) of key 
stakeholders. The following case study presents evidence in chronological order to identify 
changes in institutional indicators and describes institutional transformations due to the entry of 






FIFA and the World Cup: contextual background  
 
 Fédération Internationale de Football Association or more commonly known as FIFA 
has complete autonomy over the governance of football globally (Garcia & Meier, 2015). Every 
four years FIFA organizes the FIFA World Cup, which is the largest watched sports event in the 
world (Shazi, 2018). Football, and specifically the World Cup, has become a sign of cohesion or 
exclusion, which is important in identity politics (Giulianotti & Robertson, 2012). A number of 
states have used FIFA as a political arena (Garcia & Meier, 2015). For example, East Germany 
used athletes to get international recognition (Balbier 2005), while Taiwan’s appearance in any 
sport event could be perceived by China as an attack on its sovereignty (Homburg 2006). 
Similarly, one of Bosnia-Herzegovina first actions after independence was to apply to be part of 
FIFA (Sugden and Tomlinson 1998a: 305). The World Cup, therefore, has an important role in 
identity politics as hosting the event allows a nation to be temporarily in the international 
spotlight (Garcia & Meier, 2015). 
Although the World Cup is enticing to host for nations, the host nation also has to comply 
with FIFA’s standards for the event. By presenting a successful bid to host the World Cup, host 
nations accept a number of conditions all described within the “Guide to bidding document” 
(FIFA, 2018). Some notable changes include: tax exemptions to FIFA and third parties related to 
FIFA, national protection of FIFA’s commercial rights, upgrades in national security, 
developments in transportation, improved stadia (which in the past has led to forced eviction) 
(Amaral, 2013), availability in hotels and many other large structural changes to cater to FIFA’s 
demands. Host countries must give up many norms, laws and values to the World Cup during the 
event. Finally, it is important to understand that supporting FIFA are a number of sponsors 
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ranking from primary tier to tertiary tier. Primary tier sponsors have exclusive rights at all FIFA 
events. Secondary sponsors right extend solely to the World Cup and Confederations Cup and 
tertiary sponsors are local brands present for only the current World Cup (FIFA.com, 2018). 
FIFA names these brands its family, and like a family, FIFA takes care of them, more 
specifically of their commercial interests (Gornall, 2014). The case of beer regulations is 
particularly illustrative of this case. 
 In the following sections, we analyze how beer was reintroduced into Brazilian stadia. 
This was the result of a condition imposed on Brazil by FIFA via the World Cup (which we 
qualify as a temporary institution) because Budweiser was a sponsor of FIFA during that time.    
 
Institutional stability: Before the World Cup   
 Beer brands in Brazil have always had a strong regulative presence and power. As an 
example, Professor Mauricio Murad on the topic of breweries stated that “breweries are very 
strong, the lobby next to the legislature is very large” (Bonsanti, 2015). Notably, according to 
Godoy (2014), beer brands back in 1996 convinced the Brazilian state that only liquids 
containing over 13% of alcohol content were categorized as alcohol, therefore exempting beer 
from that label. This law in turn allowed beer to be sold at night and in stadia. The Law 
9294/1996 states that alcohol cannot be associated with sports, but since beer, according to the 
law, is not “alcohol” it does not fall under that provision of the law.  Beer and football went so 
hand in hand that “according to a study by the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) of 2012, one in 
every four beers consumed in Brazil is related to soccer” (De Moraes and Braziliense, 2015)  
However, beer consumption in stadia came under scrutiny. Due to violence and 
mismanagement within sports stadia across Brazil, a law was created for Brazilian football 
 21 
 
(soccer) stadia with the goal to protect its fans. The law Fan Statute/Lei do torcerdor (Law 
10.671 / 2003), addressed violence in stadia and better protection of the fans (Bentzen, 2014).  
Under this law, beer was prohibited as further described in the subsequent section. Beer was 
associated with violence in states prior to this law, for example in a match between Corinthians 
and Flamengo in 1991, labeled the “Night of the Bottles”, fans threw beer bottles at players, 
which motivated a ban on the sale of beer in São Paulo stadia (Appendix C: Picture 2) (Zancheta, 
2014). As stated by Paulo Castilho a public prosecutor in Sao Paulo, “with alcohol, people lose 
their moral brakes, and are more prone to violence.” (Association of the Public Prosecutor of 
Espirito Santo, 2009). Further, statements from the group for the Prevention and Combat of 
Violence in Stadia, Antônio Baêta states “As much as there are those who drink and do nothing, 
there are many who are braver, braver, because of it. And that potentiates the fights" (Winckler, 
2013). In summary, alcohol consumption was normatively and cognitively associated with 
violence and the sales of beer became restricted.  
Due to violence in Brazilian football stadia, the Brazilian Government adopted the 
federal law, Lei do torcedor (Law 10.671 / 2003). One of the conditions of this new federal law 
was the prohibition of beer in stadia through Art-13A: “one should not carry objects, drinks or 
substances which could cause or create possibilities the practice of acts of violence” 
(Planalto.gov.br, 2012). In 2008, the Brazilian Football Federation followed along signing a 
document supporting the beer ban in stadia for all matches hosted by the Brazilian Football 
Federation (Pinsky, 2014; de Moraes and Braziliense, 2015). The success of these regulative 
changes in reducing violence were seen in Mineirão where “the president of the National Council 
of Attorneys General (CNPG), Marfan Vieira” stated “that there was a 70% reduction in violence 
rates, which shows the correctness of the measure” (Antonio Cruz, 2011). Further, Marfan Vieira 
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said that the changes in beer laws substantially reduced violence in where the Brazilian Football 
Federation imposed beer bans (Antonio Cruz, 2011). From that time forward, there was a 
normative and cognitive consensus within Brazilian society that alcohol and football were a bad 
combination resulting in violence. This observation is further supported by a conversation with a 
member of Anheuser-Busch InBev whom stated: 
“it's that image that beer with soccer or with football gets a negative thing. And this is what 
the company was really concerned of not letting this association happen <…> Yeah that's 
right. There were video and media campaigns about how to behave and to drink with 
moderation” (Interviewee four, Appendix E) 
Brewers were left with little option as going against this decision was perceived to go against 
public welfare. This position was validated by the reduction of violence in states and the 
perception of members of society that beer in stadia was normatively unacceptable and 
cognitively unthinkable.  
 
The Brazilian World Cup Bid. In 2006, between the adoption of Lei do torcedor and 
Brazil Football’s Federation ban on alcohol consumption in football stadia, Brazil placed a bid to 
host the FIFA World Cup. A year later, by unanimous decision, Brazil was chosen in 2007 to 
host the World Cup for 2014. With this bid Brazil accepted all conditions of FIFA for the World 
Cup (Gornall, 2014). A detailed report of all these conditions is outlined in Brazil’s bid 
document (Fifa.com, 2007). As previously mentioned, FIFA, which is sponsored by a number of 
companies including Budweiser, had stakes in this event. FIFA required a number of changes to 
Brazilian laws. Of interest, FIFA demanded alcohol to be allowed in stadia during the World 
Cup (2014) and the Confederations Cup (2013). Because Brazil bid to host the event and was 
chosen for the World Cup, beer which had been prohibited in stadia for over a decade, had to be 
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re-introduced. This regulative change in favour of Budweiser (MNE) may have never been 
achieved via individual action. However, because of the World Cup and FIFA, Brazilian 
President Rousseff signed the bill: The general law of the World Cup (Law of the World Cup 
Brazil: Law 12.663, 2012).  This decision was largely considered as counter-normative and 
caused a strong backlash. Certain politicians accused the central government of playing politics 
with FIFA, while health minister, Alexandre Padilha urged for the ban to be maintained (BBC 
News, 2012). Other notable examples include members of parliament publicly protesting against 
alcohol in football stadia (Appendix: B, Picture 1). While a member of the chamber of deputies, 
Carmen Zanotto stated that “the release sends a wrong message about the consumption of 
alcohol in football matches and can lead to a similar future measure in the national 
championships. It's not just the danger of fans, of rivalry, but of associating the Cup with alcohol 
consumption,” (Larcher & Oliveira, 2012). 
 However, FIFA’s communication was clear in demanding institutional reforms in favour 
of beer laws: “Alcoholic drinks are part of the FIFA World Cup, so we’re going to have them. 
…, that’s something we won’t negotiate. The fact that we have the right to sell beer has to be a 
part of the law” (Pinsky, 2014). Thus, beer was re-allowed into Brazilian stadia much to the 
dismay of certain Brazilian public figures. For example, Ronaldo Laranjeira, a professor at the 
Federal university of Sao Paulo, was “shocked that FIFA can come to a country and makes it 
change its laws” (Sturgeon, 2014).  While, Heloisa Reis, an assistant professor at the State 
University of Campinas said: “It's absurd! A sporting entity to dictate the rules of what should 
and should not be changed in a country for a sporting event to occur is to injure national 
sovereignty” (Iglesias, 2009). Despite public backlash, the regulative change was maintained and 
offered brewers the opportunity to have beer alongside football again and potentially sway 
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normative and cognitive opinions. Statements by the Federal Senate suggested that this was but a 
temporary change: "They will only be able to sell them during the World Cup; we're not going to 
allow it in general” (BBC News, 2012) reducing the potential opposition to the temporary 
change, explicitly communicating it was not something to get used to.  
 
Temporary institution: During the World Cup 
 The World Cup 2014 lasted for a month from the 12th of June till the 13th of July, during 
which beer was back on the menu. Since Budweiser is a sponsor of FIFA, it was the only brand 
allowed in football stadia for the duration of the World Cup. Other beer brands, despite not being 
able to use official FIFA logos, advertised their product in relation to the event. The 
reintroduction of beer into stadia resulted in two factions: those who were for beer and those who 
were against.  Table one as well as supporting imagery (Appendix C: Image: 3,4,5) covers some 
of the campaigning and discourse used for and against beer consumption. 
 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert table one about here 
------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Normative campaigning: Against beer consumption. The World Cup ensured that beer 
could be consumed in Brazil during the event. The anti-beer campaigners tried to sway public 
opinion on alcohol consumption. An example of their endeavors to sway national opinions was 
the “Beer is alcohol campaign” (Appendix C: Image 4) set up by the Public ministry of the state 
of Sao Paulo. They sent a petition to the National Congress to amend the law 9.294 / 96 to 
change restrictions on the advertising of alcohol to beverages with alcohol content higher than 
0.5% (Godoy, 2014). The campaign was backed by major institutions including Tobacco Control 
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Alliance, Federal Council of Medicine, General Convention of God in Brazil and others (Public 
Ministry of the State of São Paulo, n.d.). 
 The World Cup, a global event, was in the international spotlight. TV shows like Last 
Week Tonight criticized FIFA and Brazil for changing beer laws (FIFA and the World Cup: Last 
Week Tonight with John Oliver [HBO], 2014). Further, an article by Gorrnall (2014) in the 
British Medical Journal which received attention stated: “Public health may be one of the biggest 
losers in the World Cup” (Collucci and Nublat, 2014) and “whichever country hoists aloft the 
World Cup trophy on 13 July, the real winner will be the alcohol industry” (Gornall, 2014).  
 This normative campaigning against beer consumption challenged the legitimacy of 
alcohol consumption in general and questioned FIFA in imposing policies that are a setback to 
public health. They used the temporary institution of the World Cup as a platform for their 
initiatives. Given that beer was temporarily allowed a small misstep or case of violence due to 
alcohol could further amplify the cognitive assumptions that alcohol and football do not belong 
together.  
 
Normative campaigning: For beer consumption. The pro-beer stakeholders 
participated in their own normative campaigning. Now that alcohol was in the stadia, beer brands 
were seen everywhere. For example, in the bleachers Budweiser and Brahma cups were seen 
(Appendix C: picture 3), halftime commercials were heavily centralized around beer, Budweiser 
had a beer themed hotel (Appendix C: picture 4) and one of the stadia where the most goals were 
scored was named after a beer brand (Godoy, 2014). Furthermore, Anheuser-Busch InBev fought 
back decisively against the British Medical Journal article saying that it is always open with the 
press and “which is why the incorrect company-related information reported in the British 
medical journal is a source of surprise” (Collucci and Nublat, 2014). It supported this claim with 
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a number of points: Refuting fiscal incentives, shallow assessment and disproving the harm of 
alcohol. In our interviews we found that the normative impact during the World Cup was 
significant. One of our informants said that the World Cup was    
“…an event or an occasion where people are fond of having a beer and having fun and 
have a good time. There is a direct emotional association between what you are 
consuming and how you're feeling, right? So the whole concept of having such a well-
oiled organization as the World Cup where people really have a good time I mean 90 plus 
percent of the people to have a good time because the spirit is there somewhere else and 
they go to the stadium and there's all the organization etc.. this legacy … it's an important 
legacy it is a relevant legacy because people see an emotional attachment to the brand” 
(Interviewee four, Appendix E) 
This quote shows how the World Cup rekindled positive relationships between alcohol 
and football. Budweiser (MNE) accompanied by other local beer brands used FIFA’s demands 
for the World Cup to enter and reform public opinion. Through the temporary practice of beer 
consumption in stadia, there was a normative repositioning in favour of beer consumption. This 
trend was reflected by certain members of Brazilian society. For example, the sport minister 
backed the beer back into the stadia campaign stating the following "How will the stadium 
operator get an income by granting a bar that cannot sell beer, which cannot sell drink?" 
(Amazonianarede.com.br, 2014). Further, the shift in public opinion was also reflected by 
opinions of “Brazilian health professionals” who say that “the alcohol industry is now “running 
the show” and fear that the changes may become permanent” (Hosford, 2014). 
The very fact that both factions tried to sway public opinion on beer consumption in 
stadia suggests that this regulative issue could be legitimately re-evaluated due to lack of 
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violence during the event. As the next section demonstrates, certain saw an opportunity to effect 
changes in Brazilian endemic institutions for good. The World Cup’s temporary institution 
replaced the laws existing in Brazil before the World Cup. The lack of violence during the World 
Cup revealed that the cognitive template that existed before the event, that beer resulted in 
violence in stadia, may be flawed.  
Institutional instability: After the World Cup 
The World Cup for the beer industry was a normative legitimacy defibrillator, beer and 
football fusion resulted in no noticeable violence, football stadia from the World Cup were far 
too large to afford foregoing beer sales revenue, and people now had re-experienced consuming 
beer in stadia.  
After the World Cup, many states started questioning the framework that existed before 
the World Cup. Certain states started to re-introduce beer into their stadia and others did not. 
Figure one demonstrates that, since the World Cup, many but not all have introduced beer into 
stadia. This image, despite being currently up-to-date, is still changing to this day. For example, 
in Sao Paulo, teams are currently on rare occasion joining forces to try and sway state officials to 
have beer re-introduced (GloboEsporte.com, 2019) (Appendix C: Image 7). 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert figure one about here 
------------------------------------------------------- 
 
  After the World Cup, state officials started questioning the federal law (Lei do torcedor) 
for its ambiguity: “One should not carry objects, drinks or substances which could cause or 
create possibilities the practice of acts of violence” (Planalto.gov.br, 2012). As one of our 
informants pointed out, 
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“Yes. Yes. Very weird. It seems like they had just realized that the law is very fragile. 
They didn't notice before. <…> It does not specifically prohibit alcohol but can be 
interpreted this way, that's a federal law”. (Interviewee five, Appendix E) 
The state of Bahia was the first to re-allow alcohol into its stadia. Bahia was already 
active in deregulation even before the beginning of the World Cup. The beer brand Itaipeva 
made a deal in 2013 for 10 million dollars to secure the naming rights of the stadium being built 
for the World Cup. Months after this was announced, beer was re-accepted into the stadium 
(Bonsanti, 2015; Xavier, 2014). The president of Bahia defended the new law: "we did not have 
problems, with drink or without drink, and we already had several classics" (de Moraes and 
Braziliense 2015). Since Bahia’s deregulation, many other states have re-introduced beer into its 
stadia: Acre, Amapa, Piaui, Ceara, Rio Grande de Norte, Pernambuco, Sergipe, Minas Gerais, 
Espirito Santo, Rio de Janeiro, Santa Caterina, Mato Grosso. Other states still comply with the 
federal law for normative and regulative reasons which will be described subsequently. 
The World Cup destabilized the idea that alcohol and football resulted in violence. The 
World Cup showed the Brazilian population that beer and football could coexist:  
“During the Confederations Cup and the World Cup, the General Law of the World Cup 
created an exception for one of FIFA's sponsors to sell their products during matches. 
This text served the interests of the organization of the World Cup, and created a vacuum 
that is being used by the legislators to release the consumption and commercialization of 
alcohol in the arenas, from Rio Grande do Sul to Rio Grande do Norte” (Bonsanti, 2015).  
 The World Cup as a temporary institution introduced members of society to a different 
reality and changed their taken-for-granted assumptions. In certain states, fans of football were 
found publicly mocking laws that were still in place. As an example, in Minas Gerais where beer 
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is allowed till the end of the 1st half, fans publicly mocked the law in place and continued to 
consume after the first half (Paulucci, 2015). While in other states fans made posters (Appendix 
C: image 9) and attended public hearings to try and sway state officials’ opinions (Appendix C: 
image 8 and 6) 
 The discourse surrounding beer re-introduction has been lively since the World Cup, as 
summarized in table two below. Those against beer reintroduction were challenging its 
legitimacy. A regulative argument was that it was unconstitutional as national law does not 
permit alcohol in stadia, while the normative argument was to remind state officials that alcohol 
causes violence.  As an example, in the state Pernambuco, where a new law allowed beer into 
stadia, certain stakeholders criticized this change calling it a setback, “a pressure cooker for more 
violence” and were also challenged on the legality of the new regulation as it "exceeds the limits 
of the concurrent legislative competence" (Bonsanti, 2015; Pernambuco, 2016). According to 
one of our informants, states choice of regulation or deregulation stems from their political 
orientation for or against the change (Interviewee five, Appendix E). The states whom are in 
favour of change often claimed that 1) beer did not lead to violence at the World Cup 2) beer 
sales were an economic motor 3) the emotional nostalgic appeal that beer and soccer go hand in 
hand 4) and the regulative argument that Lei do torcedor does not explicitly regulate beer 
consumption. From this reasoning, many states and fans had changed their perception and 
questioned previous institutional rules prior to the World Cup.  
 
------------------------------------------------------- 





In summary, the temporary institution provided by FIFA at the World Cup in Brazil 
changed the institutional framework that prohibited beer consumption in stadia. Prior to the 
World Cup, normative and cognitive perceptions were that football and alcohol lead to violence 
and therefor, a regulative restriction was in place. Members within this same institutional 
framework during the World Cup saw institutional change happen, which led to previous taken-
for-granted assumptions to be questioned.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
In this exploratory case study, we set out to investigate an important phenomenon which 
occurs globally on a relatively frequent basis: the creation of temporary institutions and ensuing 
transformations. Temporary institutions are introduced in a given country for a set period of 
time, replacing sections of a national endemic institutions to perform a task. By exploring the 
dynamics of the reintroduction of beer in Brazil before, during and after the World Cup 2014, we 
show how temporary institutions as a result of a transnational corporation replace an endemic 
institution for the period of the event. Further we demonstrate how temporary institutions leave 
remnants of their institutional framework in the host country once the event is over. We 
contribute to institutional theory, institutional change and MNE’s relation with institutions, by 
demonstrating primarily that there may be theoretical limitations to what is currently understood 
in the respective theoretical domains. Our theoretical model of the process of institutional change 
following the introduction of a temporary institution is summarized in figure two. 
------------------------------------------------------- 





Institutional theory  
Institutions are generally conceived as relatively permanent and resilient to change. 
However, temporary institutions in practice exist and challenge that common perception. In the 
case study, prior to the World Cup, Brazil had an institutional framework that by law (regulative 
boundary) did not allow beer consumption in stadia since it was associated by members of 
society with violence (normative and cognitive pillars). By bidding for the World Cup, Brazil 
had to surrender certain regulative boundaries to address FIFA’s demands. As represented in 
figure two by the red box, during the World Cup, the regulative framework changed to 
accommodate beer consumption. The change was legitimized via the Brazilian government when 
bidding for the event, but lacked a certain taken-for-grantedness and normative acceptance by at 
least some members of the Brazilian society (normative & cognitive legitimacy). Thus, the 
temporary institutions created institutional turmoil in the host country by introducing an 
alternative institutional reality that prior to the World Cup may have been unthinkable. Returning 
to Berger & Luckmann (1966: 55), if institutions “control human conduct by setting up 
predefined patterns of conduct, which channel it in one direction as against the many other 
directions that would be theoretically possible”, temporary institutions unlock directions that 
become part of the realm of possibilities for human conduct. Further, “if institutions involve 
cognitive templates that individuals unconsciously enact, then actors presumably do not think 
about not complying. In fact, it is their very taken-for-grantedness that makes these institutions 
self-enforcing.” (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010: 10). Temporary institutions put into question the 
taken-for-grantedness of some institutional practices. By introducing members of society to new 
realities, stakeholders of beer consumption in stadia molded to their new environments and used 
it as a platform for normative campaigning. Therefore, a finding is that features of a temporary 
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institution introduced by a transnational corporation can sometimes stick after temporary 
institutions have departed if interested stakeholders can mobilize to make the temporary 
transformations permanent and potentially to bring about further transformations in endemic 
institutional structures. Therefore, metaphorically speaking, the World Cup is a month-long party 
but when the party is over it can leave a country with an institutional “hangover” as found in 
institutional changes of endemic institutions of a host nation. This is not necessarily always the 
case as in South Africa, during the World Cup, “instant justice courts” existed for the event but 
the legal framework returned to status quo after the event departed (Hughes, 2010). However, by 
exposing members of society to new realities and destabilizing an endemic institution, temporary 
institutions can lead to the re-evaluation of the legitimacy and validity of previous institutional 
arrangements and potentialize lasting institutional transformations. 
Within institutional theory, we suggested that temporary institutions are in fact 
institutions but are sufficiently distinct from typical perceptions of institutions. Figure two 
demonstrates how temporary institutions replace regulative institutional frameworks and are 
legitimized by national governments, suggesting that they are to a certain extent institutions 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Scott, 2008). However, we argue they are different because they 1) 
they are a source of institutional change/replacement, 2) lack taken-for-grantedness from 
members of an institutional framework and 3) are not a reflection of past nor future institutions. 
Primarily, temporary institutions during the World Cup displaced endemic regulative 
institutional framework surrounding beer consumption, since the government had to adopt 
regulations demanded by FIFA. This demonstrates how temporary institutions can be a source of 
institutional change. Second, since temporary institutions by definition lack natural taken-for-
grantedness that is usually associated with typical conceptions of institutions, the normative 
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legitimacy of temporary institutions is often questioned and contested. Finally, temporary 
institutions are not usually reflections of future nor past institutions, a characteristic which is 
usually associated with institutions (Greif, 2006; Riker 1995; Scott, 2008). Despite our case 
study showing that the national endemic institution after the World Cup reflected institutional 
arrangements of the World Cup, it is not a condition we deem to be true for all cases of 
temporary institutions.  
Practically, temporary institutions demonstrate new realities that may have previously be 
unimaginable or illegal. This gives a unique opportunity for members of a society to compare 
and act in a new institutional environment. This is valuable to local and international institutional 
stakeholders by recognizing the influence of mega events on host nations endemic institutions. 
Stakeholders can strategically benefit and leverage new institutional realities as Budweiser and 
other beer brands did during the World Cup.  
 
Institutional change  
It is generally accepted that institutions tend to persist and if they change, they usually 
change slowly. For example, Mahoney & Thelen write: “once created, institutions often change 
in subtle and gradual ways over time” (2010: 1). Figure two demonstrates how the common 
perception of gradual change does not apply for temporary institutions. Where the arrows in the 
diagram across time in the host nation institution reflect the sudden temporary changes that 
comes as a result of a mega event. It is FIFA that over its month-long event imposes boundaries 
which leaves a host country with a sudden short change in many endemic institutional domains. 
This contradicts the perception that institutions change slowly as the change at the World Cup 
was neither subtle or changing gradually over time. 
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Other arguments to explain institutional change are often separated into supply and 
demand side explanations. Supply side explanations suggest that institutional change is a result 
of actors whom have roles which enable them to create new schemas within an institution 
(Meyer; 1994), while demand side explanations suggest that institutional change aims at 
resolving problems facing a society and for which there are no solutions (Clemens & Cook; 
1999). Despite temporary institutions sharing some resemblance to both of these sets of 
explanations, these approaches fundamentally cannot explain temporary institutions. Temporary 
institutions do emerge from individual actors (FIFA). However, FIFA’s goal of hosting a 
successful World Cup did not have the goal of permanently changing an endemic institution but 
rather to replace it temporarily. Therefore, as demonstrated, FIFA exists outside a national 
institutional framework and exists permanently at a transnational level. When entering a host 
nation, it is there as a “visitor”. Thus, unlike typical conceptions of demand side explanations for 
change, temporary institutions are neither embedded in the institutional framework nor 
necessarily have an interest in the future of an endemic institutions structure. The case 
demonstrated that demand side explanations of institutional change exist since institutional 
actors (beer brands & anti-alcohol campaigners) attempted and succeeded in changing the 
endemic institution via normative campaigning. Temporary institutions do not support the supply 
side logic either. Despite the World Cup demonstrating that the endemic institutional framework 
might have been flawed (the legal framework was ambiguous [regulative] and alcohol combined 
with football did not necessarily lead to violence [normative & cognitive]), temporary 
institutions do not exist because the nation was facing a problem for which no solution existed.  
  Shocks and jolts, a final approach to explain institutional change, are “transient 
perturbations whose occurrences are difficult to foresee and whose impact on organizations are 
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disruptive and often inimical” (Meyer; 1982; 515). But, temporary institutions are not difficult to 
foresee as country’s bid to host them. Further, it does not always lead to lasting changes in 
endemic institutions but rather replaces them temporarily. It is this temporality which does not 
suit any description of change as temporary institutions replace and leave, rather than changing a 
current endemic institutional structure.  
 In summary, temporary institutions cannot be explained by accounts of institutional 
change as they fundamentally lack certain characteristics that define institutional change. 
Temporary institutions do not correspond to demand nor supply side explanations, temporarily 
replace rather than providing lasting changes in endemic institutions and are foreseen and wanted 
by institutional actors.  
 Practically, this concept is important to understand as acknowledging temporary 
institutions as a source of change for endemic institutions allows host nations to possibly be able 
to better address the impacts that follow from the entry of temporary institutions. For example, 
the lack of understanding of temporary institutions is potentially demonstrated by many 
researchers offering conflicting opinions on the benefits and pitfalls of hosting mega events. 
Some researchers point to positives associated with hosting a mega event, rise in birth rates (Liu, 
2013), happier citizens (Allmers & Maennig, 2009), short term employment and revenue 
(Goodman & Stern, 1994). However, other researchers find there are many negatives as well, 
forced resettling (COHRE, 2007), operating costs higher than income (Kim & Morgan, 2017), or 






MNE’s and institutions 
 Figure 4, shows that outside FIFA’s mega-event, the World Cup, FIFA is a transnational 
company that is a latent carrier of institutions. From a multi-level perspective, on a transnational 
level they are relatively permanent, and on a national level they exist and enforce regulative 
demands temporarily every four years. This special arrangement carries with it some theoretical 
contributions on our understanding of multinational enterprises (MNE) relationship with 
institutions.  
Research into MNEs has become increasingly prevalent in institutional research. The 
case study demonstrated that certain relationships between a host nation and an MNE do not 
necessarily apply to temporary institutions. For example, typically an MNE when entering a 
nation usually must conform with the institutional framework (regulative, normative and 
cognitive) of a host nation to gain legitimacy (Dacin, Kostova, & Roth, 2008; Doh & Guay, 
2004; Hiatt, Sine, & Tolbert, 2009 Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999) and 
are often limited in their ability to change endemic institutions. Further, MNEs can often only 
achieve institutional change in transitional economies where there is institutional instability 
(Dacin, Kostova, & Roth 2008). Temporary institutions challenge this premise: 1) the case study 
demonstrates that an MNE (FIFA) via temporary institutions can enforce regulative change in 
endemic institutions and are often rigid against host nations request for institutional flexibility. 
This is unique to how MNE’s usually enter host nations as they typically do not come upon 
invitation. FIFA via having countries bid for the privilege to host the event can make certain 
demands; 2) By sponsoring organizing entities of mega events, MNEs can achieve favourable 
legislative outcomes for the duration of the event. Budweiser by piggybacking on FIFA’s 
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temporary institutions was able to achieve favourable legislative outcomes by being the 
exclusive beer vendor inside Brazilian stadia during the World Cup. 
Practically this is a new avenue for MNEs to enter a host nation by creating an event that 
countries wish to host. While another option is sponsoring mega-events and leveraging that 
relationship to enter and temporarily exist in a favourable institutional environment such as 
Budweiser did in our case study.  
 
Conclusion 
 To summarize, this paper contributes to our understanding of institutional theory in a 
number of ways. First, we establish that temporary institutions exist in practice and that they are 
a specific instantiation of institution. Second, we show how certain transnational organizations 
carry temporary institutions that at a national level cause temporary institutional change. Third, 
temporary institutions are unique in the institutional field and are different to institutional theory, 
institutional change theory, and MNE’s relation with institutions. Finally, we found that, despite 
temporary institutions existing for a set period of time, they expose local actors to new 
institutional arrangements, which can lead to remnants of the temporary institution to exist in 
national endemic institutional arrangements after the temporary institution has departed. 
Practically, this has important implications as these events identified happens relatively often and 
have the potential to have large regulative, normative and cognitive impacts on endemic 





Limitations and future research 
 
Limitations 
 Many of the limitations of this study largely are due to the qualitative, exploratory 
nature, which may limit the generalization of our findings to other institutional contexts. Despite 
certain flaws we believe our findings still hold in other contexts similar to the one described in 
this paper. The following section attempts to outline these flaws meticulously so that future 
research can better approach these phenomena. The study largely followed best practices for case 
study design (Yin, 2003). Despite triangulating and laying out a chain of events, ideally the draft 
should be reviewed by key informants and have a number of additional interviews to further 
validate our findings. We struggled to do so as many informants located in Brazil only spoke 
Portuguese and were hard to access, which limited our number of interviews. We attempted to 
compensate by having multiple sources of evidence (pictures, legal documents and news 
articles). Further, we would have liked to replicate our study in another context (i.e., for another 
temporary institution). Future research could extend this current study to other World Cups and 
transformations such as instant court justice system in South Africa 2010 (Hughes, 2010), the 
“Gay propaganda law,” or changes in visa procedures in Russia 2018 (Harvey, 2018). 
Alternatively, the study can be replicated to examine adjustments in alcohol laws in Qatar 2022 
(Rowe, 2019). These cases are extremely interesting as our study looked at a change in the 
matter of public health. But changes in visa applications is a concern for national security in 
Russia, while change in beer laws in Qatar are an overhaul of national values since alcohol is not 
allowed, even outside stadia. Finally, many allegations and prosecutions for bribery and 
corruption have come to the surface regarding the World Cup and Olympics in Brazil (Chade, 
2017). The question is if any of the results of our study were influenced by unlawful actions, this 
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is why further studies replicating or mimicking our study can further validate our findings to 




The limitations presented in the previous section are a note of caution for future 
researchers when studying temporary institutions. This section looks at a number of avenues for 
future research. First, as previously suggested future research could replicate this study at the 
World Cup in 2022, in addition future research should further explore other contexts (Legal 
system in South Africa, Gay propaganda laws in Russia) or other types of temporary institutions. 
It is important to look at other contexts to be able to observe the degree of change and impact 
that can result from a temporary institution. Further, it is important to differentiate how different 
mega-events may have variable abilities in causing institutional change depending on their 
popularity in host nations. Second, future studies should look into transnational organizations 
that act as latent carriers of such institutions. Studies could look at how changes at the 
transnational level affect the temporary institutions they carry. One of our informants told us 
how the Olympics have become more flexible with its institutional request due to international 
pressure (Interviewee six, Appendix E). Further, studies into organizations that sponsor mega-
events may be useful. Example of research questions include: to what extent do sponsoring 
enterprises dictate changes in the temporary institutions in a host nation? Finally, future studies 
should investigate the impact of temporary institutions after they have departed. Studies could 
look at industries that most significantly benefit from temporary institutions existing and those 
who suffer the most. While other studies could investigate if events such as the World Cup leave 
similar impacts on national endemic institutions after they have departed. These are some of the 
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topics that our study touched tangentially, and therein offer potential avenues to further add 
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Appendix B: tables and imagery used in text 
 




























Table 1: Normative campaigning for and against beer re-introduction in Brazil during the 
World Cup 
 
Strategies Examples- discourse in favour of beer re-
introduction 




“Budweiser stores, open to all ages, boasted a large 
screen at the airports of the host cities of the FIFA 
World Cup” (Godoy, 2014) 
 
“The soil of Granja Comary, the training center of the 
Brazilian team, was also used to plant barley from a 
special edition of Brahma, announced by the then 
popular Luiz Felipe Scolari.” (Godoy, 2014) 
 
“The stadium with the highest goal average of the Cup 
was that of the Arena Itaipava, in Salvador. The carioca 
brewery also gives name to the stadium that received the 
games in Recife” (Godoy, 2014) 
 
“Filled in the bleachers of the World Cup arenas, fans 
would display Budweiser or Brahma cups, customized 
for each of the 64 World Cup duels.” (Godoy, 2014) 
 
Sports minister, Aldo Rebello: "How will the stadium 
operator get an income by granting a bar that cannot sell 
beer, which cannot sell drink?"  
(Amazonianarede.com.br, 2014). 
 
“Budweiser hotel” used as advertising for the brand 
(Brown, 2014) 
The Alana Institute when asked about the World Cup: "The 
fight against alcohol should be taken more seriously. Of 
course, children are directly influenced by the culture of 
alcohol, encouraged by advertising, especially beer. There 
should be at least a time restriction and a ban on 
sponsorship. (Consciencia, 2014)  
 
“An important step in spreading this debate is the 
strengthening of the "Beer is also Alcohol " campaign, 
sponsored by the Public Prosecutor's Office of São Paulo. 
With more than 75 thousand signatures” (Godoy, 2014) 
 
“Public health may be one of the biggest losers in the 
World Cup” (Collucci and Nublat, 2014) 
 
 “Whichever country hoists aloft the World Cup trophy on 










Table 2: Discourse surrounding beer re-introduction in Brazil after the World Cup 
 





"We are totally against it, because we think 
it's a setback, because it is an affront to the 
supporter's right, to the right to safety and an 
offense to the Fan Statute as well," (Opovo 
online, 2018) 
 
“It is clear that the sale of alcoholic 
beverages at stadiums is currently 
prohibited, so that the Union has already 
exercised concurrent legislative competence 
on the matter related to consumption and 
sport” (Barbosa, 2019) 
 
“Sandra Malta says that the action of trying 
to release the sale and consumption inside 
the stadiums is "unconstitutional" and 
should not be approved” (Manoel, 2019) 
Ceara, Pariba, Alagoas, Minas gerais, Sao 
Paulo, Rio Grande Do sul 
Cause for violence 
"Evidence remains that alcohol consumption 
increases violence," says Angelo Campana, 
president of Abead. "The interest of the 
federations is commercial," (Junior, 2017) 
 
"It is important to point out that with 
excessive consumption of alcohol in the 
stadiums (football and alcohol = national 
passion), the rate of violence will increase 
considerably” (Perrone, 2019) 
 
“since the ban on the sale of beverages in 
stadiums, there has been a significant 
reduction in incidents during games." 
(BeerArt, 2019) 
 
“As a doctor, I can say that drinking causes 
more accidents, more fighting. It will 
increase hospital expenses with vandalism. 
This project is an affront to society” 
(Espinoza, 2017) 
Ceara, Pariba, Alagoas, Sao Paulo, Rio 





The World Cup 
showed beer does 
not cause violence 
“The success of the beer sales during the 
World Cup and the Olympics is causing 
some states of the Federation to be changing 
the law … and all informed us that they are 
not occurring problems related to violence” 
(Junior, 2016) 
 
Evandro Leitã, Ceara sporting club: "In 
basketball games, too, why would only 
football be harmed?" "There was a sale in 
the World Cup itself," (Diario, 2017) 
 
I've always seen the fans drinking their beer, 
chatting and eating our famous tropeiro. 
Alcohol has never been a source of violence 
in the stadiums. " (Dolzan, 2015) 
 
Acre, Alagoas Bahia, Espírito Santo, Goiás, 
Mato Grosso do Sul, Minas Gerais, Rio de 
Janeiro, Para, Rio Grande do Norte, Rio de 
janeiro Piaui, Ceara, Rio Grande Do sul, 
Santa Caterina, Goias, Mato Grosso 
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“The World Cup show that the Brazilian 
knows how to cheer and drink civilly” 
(Rech, 2018) 
 
"Violence has nothing to do with beer sales 
in stadiums. Many developed countries 
maintain this trade and have never had this 
problem” (Parrode, 2016) 
 
Finance needed to 
support operations 
“Lion of the Island loses about $ 30,000 per 
game because he cannot market beer at the 
stadium.”  (Junior, 2016) 
 
"It is important to emphasize that the 
fundamental issue of this discussion is the 
revenue for the teams ..” (Rodrigues, 2019) 
 
"With the release, this could open up more 
revenue for the club and the FAF itself," 
(Manoel, 2019) 
 
“It's a club win. Our football is undergoing 
many difficulties and needed an extra 
attraction. The trend is that the games have 
more public and that the clubs have more 
possibilities to get sponsors.” (Dias, 2014) 
 
“The marketing of drinks in the stadiums 
represents an important source of revenue 
for our clubs.” (FCF.com, 2017) 
 
"The return of the commercialization of 
alcoholic beverages is a way to contribute to 
the collection of income of the clubs, mainly 
for the teams of the interior of the State.” 
(BeerArt, 2019) 
Santa Caterina, Amazonas, Alagoas, Bahia, 
Espirito Santo, Rio de Janeiro, Santa 
Caterina, Rio Grande Do sul, Mato grosso  
Nostalgia of fans  
“The more haughty in the bleachers feel the 
nostalgia of being able to drink alcoholic 
drink in the Trapichão” (Manoel, 2019) 
 
“56% of the supporters favored the sale of 
sports drinks at the stadiums, 43% against” 
(Junior, 2017) 
 
“In Brazil and in many other countries, there 
is still the cultural factor that involves 
football and beer consumption. We will 
have a great Championship Catarinense in 
2018 and with the return of beer also more 
fans prestige our sport.” (FCF.com, 2017) 
 
 
Alagoas, Bahia, espirito santo, Sao Paulo, 
Santa Caterina 
Statute of the fan is 
vulnerable 
“Argued that the Fan Statute does not 
explicitly prohibit the sale and consumption 
of alcoholic beverages at sporting events 
and does not agree with the association of 
commercialization with violence at 
stadiums.”  (GloboEsporte.com, 2017) 
 
“The Statute of the Fan, federal law that 
addresses the theme, allows for different 
interpretations.” (Junior, 2017) 




Figure 2: Temporary institutions and institutional change, a process model   
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Appendix C: Supporting imagery empirical context 
 
Before the World Cup 
Image 1: “No alcohol sales at football stadiums”: Members of parliament protest alcohol in 
football stadia, addressing FIFA’s demand for beer sales in football stadia’s (Segalla, 2012) 
 
 
Image 2: “Match between Corinthians and Flamengo in the 1991 Libertadores, known as “Night 
of the Bottles”” where fans through beer bottles at players “motivated ban on the sale of drinks 





During the World cup 
Image 3) World Cup themed cups from Brazilian beer brand Brahma (red) and golden cups from 
official World Cup sponsor Budweiser (Teixeira, 2015) 
 
Image 4) Beer is alcohol campaign, by the the Public Prosecution Service of the State of São 





Image 5) Budweiser takes over the five-star hotel, Pestana for the duration of the World Cup for 











After the World Cup 
Image 6) Leaders and fans of clubs in Espirito Santo took banners to the plenary assembly 
(Photo: Sidney Magno Novo / GloboEsporte.com) 
 
 
Image 7) Corinthians, Palmeiras, Sao Paulo and Santos on rare occasion join in action to 







Image 8) “No beer, empty stadium”. In the state of Santa Catarina demonstrations for and against 
beer liberation in stadia were observed (Espinoza, 2017)  
 
 
Image 9) “Free the beer”. Atletico-PR fans' place banner at Arena da Baixada. Coritiba and 






Appendix D: Files used in the case study 
 Number of 
files retrieved  
Information 
News articles   Major sources include: UOL, Globo, 
Estadao 
Before the World Cup 31 Period: Prior to May 2013 
English and Portuguese sources 
During 23 Period: May-August 2014 
1 audio file 
English and Portuguese sources 
After the World Cup 83 Period: After August 2014  
All sources in Portuguese  
Legal documents 17 Documents include: alcohol restrictions 
before the World Cup, the general law of 
the cup for the World Cup, state beer laws 
after the World Cup, proposed changes in 
beer laws. 
Interviews 6  
FIFA Documents 5 Bidding process, public guidelines, current 
and past regulations, inspection report 
Brazil 
Images 9 images per period, Before (3), during (2) 
and after the World Cup (4) 





Appendix E: Aliases for individuals whom we interviewed 
 
 Individual information Length of conversation 
Interviewee one Activist in brazil, works for 
vice news and was featured in 
vice news documentary on 
the World Cup 2014 in Brazil 
30 minutes 
Interviewee two Employee at Budweiser UK, 
lead execution of 2018 World 
Cup activities in the United 
Kingdom 
23:49 minutes 
Interviewee three  A sports journalist on 
international and domestic 
football in Brazil 
12:02 minutes 
Interviewee four Employee of Anheuser-Busch 
InBev who worked for the 
company for 27 years and 
worked for the company 
during the 2014 World Cup 
28 minutes 
Interviewee five Brazilian Craft Beer 
journalist whom founded a 
beer-oriented website in 2013 
25 minutes 
Interviewee six Senior lecturer at 
Loughborough university in 
sports sciences, sport 
management and sociology in 
sports. Further published 
articles surrounding FIFA and 
the World Cup.   
28:23 
 
